203 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
203 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Xget - High-performance acceleration engine for developer resources
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* Copyright (C) 2025 Xi Xu
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*
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* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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/**
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* Request validation utilities for Xget
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*/
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import { CONFIG } from '../config/index.js';
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// Imported protocol checks
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import { isAIInferenceRequest } from '../protocols/ai.js';
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import { isGitLFSRequest, isGitRequest } from '../protocols/git.js';
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import { isHuggingFaceAPIRequest } from '../protocols/huggingface.js';
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/**
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* Best-effort decode for security validation.
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*
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* URL.pathname may keep some reserved characters percent-encoded (e.g. %2F).
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* We decode a couple of times to catch traversal attempts like %2e%2e%2f.
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* @param {string} pathname
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* @returns {{ok: true, value: string} | {ok: false}} Decoded path result
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*/
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function decodePathnameForValidation(pathname) {
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let decoded = pathname;
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for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
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if (!/%[0-9a-fA-F]{2}/.test(decoded)) {
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break;
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}
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try {
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decoded = decodeURIComponent(decoded);
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} catch {
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return { ok: false };
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}
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}
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return { ok: true, value: decoded };
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}
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/**
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* Detects directory traversal patterns in a URL path.
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* @param {string} pathname
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* @returns {boolean} True if traversal is detected
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*/
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function hasPathTraversal(pathname) {
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const decodedResult = decodePathnameForValidation(pathname);
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if (!decodedResult.ok) {
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return true;
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}
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const decoded = decodedResult.value.replace(/\\/g, '/');
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return /(^|\/)\.\.(\/|$)/.test(decoded);
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}
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/**
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* Checks for ASCII control characters.
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* @param {string} value
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* @returns {boolean} True if ASCII control chars are present
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*/
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function hasAsciiControlChars(value) {
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for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
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const code = value.charCodeAt(i);
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if (code <= 31 || code === 127) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* Detects if a request is a container registry operation (Docker/OCI).
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*
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* Identifies Docker and OCI registry requests by checking for:
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* - Registry API endpoints (/v2/...)
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* - Docker-specific User-Agent headers
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* - Docker/OCI manifest Accept headers
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* @param {Request} request - The incoming request object
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* @param {URL} url - Parsed URL object
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* @returns {boolean} True if this is a container registry operation
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*/
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export function isDockerRequest(request, url) {
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const { pathname } = url;
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// Check for container registry API endpoints
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if (pathname === '/v2' || pathname === '/v2/' || pathname.startsWith('/v2/')) {
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return true;
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}
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if (pathname.startsWith('/cr/')) {
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if (/^\/cr\/[^/]+\/v2(?:\/|$)/.test(pathname)) {
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return true;
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}
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const userAgent = request.headers.get('User-Agent') || '';
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if (userAgent.toLowerCase().includes('docker/')) {
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return true;
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}
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const accept = request.headers.get('Accept') || '';
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if (
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accept.includes('application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest') ||
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accept.includes('application/vnd.oci.image.manifest') ||
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accept.includes('application/vnd.docker.image.rootfs.diff.tar.gzip')
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) {
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return true;
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}
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const contentType = request.headers.get('Content-Type') || '';
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if (
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contentType.includes('application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest') ||
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contentType.includes('application/vnd.oci.image.manifest')
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) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Re-export for standard usage
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export { isAIInferenceRequest, isGitLFSRequest, isGitRequest, isHuggingFaceAPIRequest };
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/**
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* Computes the allowed methods for a request based on protocol detection.
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* @param {Request} request
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* @param {URL} url
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* @param {import('../config/index.js').ApplicationConfig} config
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* @returns {string[]} Allowed HTTP methods for this request shape.
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*/
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export function getAllowedMethods(request, url, config = CONFIG) {
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const isGit = isGitRequest(request, url);
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const isGitLFS = isGitLFSRequest(request, url);
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const isDocker = isDockerRequest(request, url);
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const isAI = isAIInferenceRequest(request, url);
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const isHF = isHuggingFaceAPIRequest(request, url);
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return isGit || isGitLFS || isDocker || isAI || isHF
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? ['GET', 'HEAD', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE']
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: config.SECURITY.ALLOWED_METHODS;
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}
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/**
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* Validates incoming requests against security rules.
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*
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* Performs security validation including:
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* - HTTP method validation (with special allowances for Git/Docker/AI operations)
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* - URL path length limits
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*
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* Different protocols have different allowed methods:
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* - Regular requests: GET, HEAD (configurable via SECURITY.ALLOWED_METHODS)
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* - Git/LFS/Docker/AI: GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, PATCH
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* @param {Request} request - The incoming request object
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* @param {URL} url - Parsed URL object
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* @param {import('../config/index.js').ApplicationConfig} config - Configuration object
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* @returns {{valid: boolean, error?: string, status?: number}} Validation result object
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*/
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export function validateRequest(request, url, config = CONFIG) {
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const allowedMethods = getAllowedMethods(request, url, config);
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if (!allowedMethods.includes(request.method)) {
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return { valid: false, error: 'Method not allowed', status: 405 };
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}
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if (url.pathname.length > config.SECURITY.MAX_PATH_LENGTH) {
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return { valid: false, error: 'Path too long', status: 414 };
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}
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// Reject obvious traversal in the raw URL path (before URL normalization).
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// Some runtimes normalize `..` segments when parsing URL.pathname.
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const rawPathname = request.url.startsWith(url.origin)
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? request.url.slice(url.origin.length).split('?')[0].split('#')[0].replace(/\\/g, '/')
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: url.pathname;
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if (/(^|\/)\.\.(\/|$)/.test(rawPathname)) {
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return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid path', status: 400 };
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}
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// Reject control characters and directory traversal attempts.
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// This protects both our routing logic and upstream requests.
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if (hasAsciiControlChars(url.pathname)) {
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return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid path', status: 400 };
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}
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if (hasPathTraversal(url.pathname)) {
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return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid path', status: 400 };
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}
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return { valid: true };
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}
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